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FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND DOMESTIC DI$PUTES
.

;;.·

· lNTROOUCTION
Political conflicts, both violent and non-violent; ~ithtri coun~
· tries have been the occasion for military intervention in those.
countries by foreign powers.
case in point.

The·Spanish Civil War ~as a ~lassie

However, sometimes political disruption occurs with-·
.

.

.

out foreign military intervention~-as in the Nigerian..:Btafran Civ_il
,

•

.

I

-

.

•

•. .

'

.

War (for.purposes of this study, military intervention, entailed in .·
.

.

'

· the movement of•troops.ar forces, is to be distinguished fromeco-.
nomic and other non-military1forms of inter"vention, s'ome ofwh1ch
took place in the Niger~an case);· No one has yet determined the interests which are most likely to trigger military iriterven"don by one.
state in" another 1 s internal affairs, nor the costs 'likefy to".deter
.

such intervention.

.

Intervention in foreign states I domestic con.

flicts can entail conside~able costs arid risks.

"The

11

,,

wrong 11 faction

might win; intr1gue and interference mfg_ht be _publicl.Y revealed,.·:.
causing rea~tioris which mighi da~age the iritervening st~te's ~;use;
. the domestic ·conflict may spread and become bloodier; .thereby in_,.
I

•

valving and killing more nationals ·of- the intervening and - inter_vened-.
in state .
.;~

.

.

1

-- '.1. '

Orie of the most intriguing findi,_.ngs to emerge from t~e, author's
previous research on interventions is that intef've~tions in-domestic
disputes (instances in which a grou-p or faction threa;tens or attempts ·.
to over-turn the. government in an irregul~r p~wer transfer) in foreign

j

•

2

countries have tended to be mainly friendly to the government of the
foreign state (support government or oppose rebels which oppose itl,
while interventions in the absence of or apart from such disputes
have been mainly hostile to the target government.

(See authof's

citation 1973b.) This evidently means that intervening states are
somewhat wary of becoming entangled in prolonged hostile interventions in foreign states' domestic disputes.

Of course, in some cir-

cumstances prolonged domestic disputes indicate the weakness of the
government involved in the dispute, and the strength of the groups
opposing the government; in such cases, fo~eign states mighi be les~
reluctant to back the opposition groups and oppose the government
(e.g., North Vietnam intervening in South Vietnam).

It i~ als~ pas~

sible that certain interventions which did not take place in the context of a domestic dispute serious enough to threat~n the continued
existence of the government were made possible by lesser disruptions
in the target states, disruptions such as riots or protest demonstrations.
Since it seems that internal disruption can be both an invitation and a deterrent to foreign intervention, in order to predict
the probability of intervention, and perhaps even control its incidence, more must be known about the patterns of co-occurrence between
various .types of i nterna 1 disputes and various types of forei gD military intervention.

While some types of intervention might be unlikely in

countries undergoing domestic conflicts, other types of intervention
might be quite likely.
these patterns.

This study is designed to clarify some of

\

\

3

Previous studies of the relations between-domestic, c~nflfct and
foreign military intervention' have suffered fro111 several major weak_,.

nesses:

(1) treatment of

11

intervention

11

as

a

.

.

. .

:

single "pnen·omerion-with-.

- out ~pecification of 1/ario~s types of interventio~ w~_ich might relatei
to various types of domes_tic conflict; (2) failure to spe·cify plausible rival hypotheses about the relations of domestic confUct and
foreign intervention; (3) inaccurate measurement of int~~ventiori and
_of inte·rvention's relations to domestic _conflicts due to faulty da_ta
ccilletti~n and methods inappropriate
to
those ·_data; and . (4)
agtjrega-.
.
.
0

tion of inte_rvehtions and domestic conflicts ove~_ five or more years,
so that time sequences in' the occurrence of these phenomenabeconie
.-blurred .(see Sullivan,_-,96~; Rose~au, ·1968, and 1969; and Young,.1968).
•In this--study, ~arious types of intervention id;ntified through
empirical analysi~ of interventions from 1948 to 1967 '(see author's
citation, 1973b) are related to various types of domestic conflicts,
.

.

so that.patterns

.

of domestic conflicts ·as they relate ·in time to

interventions are more i:learly revealed. - Data on interventions have been collected from the
sources,- and ~cholarlY
· -New
- -York
- - Times,. reqional
....
.
.

bo'oks and articles, with

an attempt to

'

identify the ·political, eco.

:

.

.

.

·nomic, so2ial, or milit~ry. goals and consequences· of the-interventions.
Data are analyzed· both across an aggregate of years (1960-67), and, _
using daily 9omesti~ conflict-events r,eported in thesecond-World.
Handbook ~f Political -~nd Social In:dicato,~s (Hudson.and Taylor, 1972),·

· · by monthly peri ads so tha_t the sequenCes in which .domes.tic conflicts
lea_d_ to or ste_m from interventions may be identified.
'

--

4

Foreign military i hterventi on is· defined as the movement of
troops or.military forces by. one i ndepen.denY country (or a group of
countries

in concert)_ aeras~:. the

border of another .independent coury-

try (or ..,colony
of an i ndepend_ent country},
or actions by-. troops ~1- --.
.

.

'

"

,

,

.

'

ready stationed in the target country. Jt is reliitively ~asy'.to
.

.

.

.

identify such troop or force movements, 'O.nd the definition avoids
.

.

the a~biguities of other definitions which dwell on actions "aimed
· at authority structures, 11 "_conventi on-brea-ki ng 11 acti ans which disrupt ·.
I

normalized relations, and actions designed to "force 'changes" iri the.
target cou~try (s~e Rosenau, 1968 and 1969; Sullivan, 1969; and
Beloff, 1968): For purposes o( the present -study, only iritervenfi ons i!l which ·

troops undertook some dfrect military action (as oppcised to lbnger7
•

•

I

,'

1

term r0latively in:ct r(ve encampment· on bases, such a_s by
in West Germany1/Were analyzed for the period 1960-67.
I

u.5-.

troops

Theoretically,.

.

·of course,_ t?-0ps coujdbe brought to a base in a target state in the
midst of d9mestic conflict in that state, take no'. direct military
I·

action~ y,t-constitute a ·deterrent" force to certain~ factions in:
j

I

the.

;

domestfc· conflict.

Future studies might fovestigate such interven- ·

tions: but presently the priority is to deter~ine whether and under_
what circumstances domes ic conflicts attract act,ve foreign military

7
•/

,

.

intervention to affect d,isputes, policies, or conditions in the. target
state.
Interventions ina,Y be classified according, to:

(l) affect {hostile,_·

i

friendly, or neutra~ w\th regard to_ihe target gbvernment--hbstile·
entailing opposition to the government or support of opposition. groups,
1

5

friendly entailing support of ,the government or opposition

to

rebe\':

groups); (2) political circu~stances of the intervention (interven;.;.

tions in domestic .disputes in the farget state, or interventions i"n
.

.

a do'mestfc.

.which the intervener does not clearly back one side in

dispute or in which troop movements have implications for target's
foreign or domestic policies or for conditions in the target stat~
in the ·absence of or apart from domestic d:isputes); and (3.) i~sues
of concern to tntervening governments (as evidenced by the behavior
of their troops once i'nside the target· and by histor.kally valid.
accounts of interests involved).

Issues may .incluqe:

(l

f territo;. ·

rial acquisiti_on or domain; (2) protection of social groups ·in the
•

•

"

✓.:"

•

'

.

-

.

'

target-~including irredentist claims; (3) protectiorr of economic in-·
terest:s in the target--including business enterprises ·or natural '"re-'.
sources; (4) protection of diplomatic or military interests i.n ~he
.

.

.target-.:..such as militc;1ry bases, embassies, or diplomats; ·(5) ideology,
.

.

involving org~nized belief systems or· doct~ines; and· (6)> regional
power balances.

Exa~ples ·of all such interyef!tions have occu.rred

's i nee 1948, and in pr~vi ous studies it has appeared that predictor
va,riables· are different for:: different types of •intervention; major
powers seem inclined to undertake economic or diplomatic-military
protective, ideologica) or regioryal power balance interve~tioniln
distant targets, while middle and small pqwers are likely ·to unde,r-:t,ake territor"ial _and so~ial-protective interventi6ns, a:s well .as
'

.

· regional, power ba la nee ti nterventions -in, nearby targets.citation 1974.)

(See author I s

6

In this- study,. various types of foreign military intervention
-

-

.

wi 11 be treated as factors both contributing to ~~d stemmlng ·from
· domes ti c-_confl i ct.· The question that must be answe~ed is Whether riots
.

.

·-

''

'

,.

.·

·,

·and other disturbances generally attract foreign military intervention
.

.

{so th~t perhaps governments
-

of

'

can expect and ·prepare

.

'

countries undergoing 5Uth disturbinces
'

for outside interfe~ence), or whether outside

. intervention results in increased ~o~estic· dis·turbances, in:which case
governments-of intervening and target countries should be prepared for
•

•

.

I

~ost-intervention disruption, or both~-and under what circumstances
such relations hold.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS ABOUT INTERVENTION AND DOMESTIC CONFLICT

There are essentially" ·four ways· in which for~ign confli-ct (in-_·
eluding i-ntervention) can be related to domestfc conflict, arid two of
these approaches are most useful ·in the search for causes, ~6ntr6Ti, ·
and c6nsequ~hces of intervention~

._

.

'

.

'

.

:

\

-

-,

First, doinestit conflict may
-

'

precede foreign conflict in two 'ways:

Tl) domes ti C conflict in one -

state might catch the interest of anotli~r state's leade_rs and cause'..
them·to send troops to the disrupted state; arid (2) domestic· conflict
within a state may cause its leaders to seek external conflict diver-.
sions and ~end trobps overse~s.

On the oth~r hand, for~i~n confli~t

may precede dome'stic conflict in two ways:

(3) troops :or: force~

-

moved to a foreign state may cause. disruptfon and ·conflict in that
1

state, as segments of the local population -resent foreign troops or

as

fighting spreads; and (4) _if· troops become embroiled 'in long ove~:..
,·

seas commitments, the home-front population may grow restive anc;I .disunified (witn,ess U.S. domestic conflict during the V1etnam war);
.I

\

7
The bulk bf conflttt research has been concentrated on t~sting
relations 2 and 4, i.e., on propositions relating a state's domestic
·. conflict behavior to its foreign conflict behavior. · (See Rummel, 1963
. Wright, ·1~65;

and 1972; Tanter, 1966; Sorokin~ 1937;

Feierab·end, et.~-, 1972; Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1969, and (~d.) 1973;
.

Zinnes and Wilkenfeld, 1971

-

.

:

; and Hazlewood, 19?3~)

.

Fihdings

have been contradictory and seem to depend on the years, regions, and
countries under study--though the. general pattern has shown relatively ·
weak relations across time between: domestic and foreign confl fct of·
.

the same state.

.

r

..

.

:

No one has empirically.studied the rel~t1bns between

intervention ~ se and conflict in the intervening state,. though.
presumably_ the patterns may be simi.lar to findings for foreign conflict in genera 1 , s i nee foreign conflict data sets, would include many
cases nf intervention:
At .this point -it seems worthwhile to investigate• propositions
cpncerning relations 1 and 3 above, since they have· been coinpar-atively
neg·le_cted in the lfterature. ·. While most conflict studies.deal with.
the foreign and domestic conflict. involvement of th·e same'.state, intervention~ seem likely to occur when ~he domesti~ confli~t of one·
,,

country triggers military action by another state.

The target coun-

try, of course, is involved in foreign conflict when it is attacked
or suffers interven.tion, and such involvement (though not specifically
.interventions) has. been, treated in certain conflict slu~ies (s~e.
'-

Phillips, 1973; and Hazlewo'od, 1973).

Findings .show _only weak or

moderate relations between foreign conflictreceived·(including·mil1:::
\

· tary·action re.ceived) by a state and its previous orsubsequent.

8

. domestic conflict (Hazlewood, l:i973:32 and 41). · Hypot,h_eses pqsitihg a
\"

'

negative rela'tion between conflict received (or se;ntr,a·nd domestic ·
,-.

;confli~t seem disconfirmed in previous studi~s (Hazlewood, -1973:44).
.

\

'

;

However,. in previous studies, interventions have been. obscure,d
in

II

con'fl i ct-recei ved 11 data co 11 ections including various forms of >

both verbal and,military conflict.

Also, the i,de_ritity a-nd likely

_motive~ of the countries sending the conflicts have riot been speci-

It does little good to know that-a country recei:ves riuch con-

fied.

flict without knowing the conflict source and context.
· In much of the research relating intervention tcf dvil conflict
in the target state (most of it theoretical as opposed t'o dafa.,.based
.

research), it has been hypothesized:

.

(1) that violent conflict is

.more likely to.attract foreign conflict· and attention than n~n-\d.olent
·\

conflict (see Rosenau, ·1964:50-60); and (2) that decision-makers pay
-

'

'

'

most attention to

11

domestic
. conflict of wide scope whi.ch might result
.

in.significant alterations of the existing authority structures of
the nation in.which such disruptfon.occuri;'~ 11

Thus, ··•structural war 11

inside a count'ry--i.e.; civil conflicts concerning many.substructures
of society and its domestic or forefgn policies, as opposed to conflicts only about personnel.filling politital roles· (coups), or about
the structure .of those roles ( 11 authority wars 11 )--are said to be most
likely to.attract foreign intervention •. (See Rosenau, 1964:66;
Sulliva,n, 1969:5; and -Kelly and Miller, 1969:23-26.)
theoretical premises of these hypotheses are that:

The general
(1) p.eople are

·more interested in violent than- in non-violent situations and. that.
there -is great\ unc~rtainty and potential threat in r&pidly_ changing

violent situations; (2) as dvi.l conflicts spread, and as they involve
11

an increasing number of universal values," they "have gr~ater rele.:.

vance for the internal affairs and foreign policies of other nations."
I

•

If insurgents win a prolonged s·tructural war, it is argu·ect, they are
·likely to drastically ~lter domestic socio~ec6nomic policies arid.thus
11

chalienge other countries to do the· same. 11
.

I

.

In addition, leaders may

take note of foreign structural wars not only because of possible
· imitative unrest at home, but also because of possible changes in .the
foreign policy of the strife-torn state if insurgents win.

(Rosenau,

1964:50-6.0 and 66-67.) (In.this regard, Till~ma (1973) ,attribute·s
. essentially a11 U.S. · i ntetventi on p~opens ity to -fear of Communist· ·
In one of the _few data-based studies of the intervention~

t~k-e-overs.)

domestic conflict linkage Sullivan· (1969) tested arid found some:support for these general hypothes.es (as argu~d bel.ow:, however, methodo~
l ogi cal problems severely l i~i t the ere di l?i li ty of these findings) ..
The proposition that mflitary int_ervention~·(both military and
non-military intervention are
treated in the 1·iterature,
tboughprop.
.

'

\

ositions are applicable specifically to military intervention} _is
more likely in violent than non-violent civil conflicts is. open to
question and must -be tested.

Indeed, Rosenau ~eems a bit iricorisis-·

_·tent in asserting that violent conflict is.:most likely·to·attract intervention, but that intensity of violence makes little differenq:!···
(Rosenau, 1964:62).

Kistory is replete with exarriplesof military in-

terventions in s"ituati,ons of relative domestic tranquility in the
.
.
.

:

~

.

. .

.

/

.

,

,

· target (e.g., Britafn,
France,
Israel into
coµn'....
'
.
. Egypt, 1956)_, or·Jn
.
.
.

'

:

.

.

.

..· '

tries with relatively .mild, _not very bloody civil .qisp_utes {e.g.,-·

,

10

_:

r .

France into Gabon during coup d'etat, 1964). _ Indeed, very violent
civil ~onflicts ~ight·deter riutside powers' intervention;depending

,'i,

upon the faction such powers favor, since such violence might:indicate
.

.

governmental· weakness or rebel strength, and since intervening· troops
could be in grave danger. -Thus, it seems quite important to investig'ate the effects of various levels and types of .violence, as well as
violence in general ..
Arguments positing structural wa~ as the most inter~entionprovoking type of domestic violence are weakened by many inconsistencie~ and tautologies.

One reas6n structUra] war is supposed to

_. b~ so intervention-provoking is the l i kel i,hood of contagion~~the ~t-

{n

tracti veness of widespread social change to populations
<

ing states.

-.

neighbor-:

"

,.

(See Rosenau, 1964:66; and Kelly and.Miller, 1969:24.)

However, not all structural wars threat~n ~o spre~d (~.g., U.S. and
Nigerian civil wars), and if confiicts spread, they may do so not
because of ideological attractiveness but because parties to the conflict-se~k ~anctuaries in neighboring states-~and this ·maj b~ true·
of non~struc'tural as well as structural wars.
.

.

Furthermore: states
.

.

may use fear bf contagion as an excuse tojustify interventions to
pursue concrete interests inside the target (e.g., t_ake terrftory)
While the target state_ is preoccupied in a severe domestic-dispute;
seems to depend more. on specific i'nter~
here intervention probability
'
.

-~ener interests 'and level of-target violence than on ihe stru~t~~al
and revolutionary nature of the violence. -Some structural disputes
may seem to threaten few foreign interests even if there is prospect
of drastic changes_in domestic or foreign policy if insurgents win;

·j

ll
•

.

.

-

I

the disrupted country may not be close to a major power or to a state
'•

...

'

sensitive to changes in that countr:-y 1 s domestic or for:eign policies;
there may be few foreign. interests inside or near the coun·try (especially concrete interests such as business operations, naturalr~_sources, favored ethnic minorities, attfactive territories, or military bases) ..·
Indeed, it is extremely difficult to identify structural wars.
How many sectors of society must be radically affected before con-:- .
cl udi ng _that a conflict is structur~l?

Enough -sectors so that for-

eign inte.rest is raised and intervention r·es:ults? _: If so, the struc..:.
tura.l war definition constitutes a tautoloqy.How else can we under;;.'
stand statements such as the following: .

11

Indeed, lengthy structural

wars, plus all types of instigated ones, constitute the only. conditi ans under which international stability is· endangered? 11 ··.(Rosenau,
•

1964: 87.)

I

Confusion about the identification of structural domestic•

wars ,relates to confusion ab6ut the role of ideology ih ~uch disputes.
Ideological content of internal conflict, number of sectors affected,
and probable changes Qf domestic and/or foreign policy are not the
same issue, and cannot be lumped toge,ther in a single category called
11

structural war. 11

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Foreign military intervention probability is likely to depend on
.

'

'

.

the identity and mutual relations of prospective intervener; ·and target,.
thefr location and the interests each has in. the other, the nature of
'
.
· any perceived threats to suc.h interests, 'power to intervene, and the
political, e_conciITlic, military, and social circumstances of thetjme.

12
Therefore, itis by n6 means certain .that structural wars are more
likely than o_th·er civil conflicts to attract foreignniilitary inter-·
vention; empirical tests of the proposition, so common in the literature, arff necessary.

I~ ·the present . study, "structural conflict'_'
'

'

0ill be taken to mean widespread violent confli~t whi~h-could entail
major chang_es in governmental policies or institutions, and/or major
· social upheaval.
(l}

Two basic questions will be. as_ked:

Is violent conflict more likely than no~-violent to attract
foreign military interventjon?

(2)

Are structural wars more likely.than· non-structural wars to
attract foreign military intervention?

As these questions are answered, an attempt will be made to identify
.fhe inter~sts and circumstances which di~tingui~h domestic co6flicts
.

. '

'

.

'

that do not res~lt in or -from intervention from those that do .. To
ans~er the~research que~tiOns, data h~ve been gathe~~~ on th~ inter~
venti ans. from. i 960-67 for comparison .to data on domestic. conflict
during this period. 1
In a previous study of intervention and internal coriflict, ~tructural war was measured rather roughly by the degree to which conflicts ·
'

.

seemed to threaten or.significantly_alter the existing "power structure"
of a society.

(Sul,liv~n. 1969:9)

Thus, riots (unorganfzed violent

demonstration.by large grol!ps), "armed attack events 11 (by organized
. groups and intended as·protests or_rebelli~ns against a regime or its policies), unsuccessful and successful irregular power trans'.fers (actual
or attempted regime overthrow) were hypothesi :Zed t~ ·approximate ;, ~true~
· tural, war" in scope and· to attract more foreign mi i itary interventi ans
,

I

i
·.

13
· than political assassinations (aimed at one person)~· an{i-government
demonstrations (non-violent), and political strikes (no.implied·
threatof regime overthrow).· -Regression analysis showe~ that domestic
armed attack events and unsuccessful coups (irregulat· p'owertransfer) .,.·
accounted for 35% of the vari·ance in "intervention:."

When size and

dependency of target were controlled for, only domestic. armed. attacks
I

significantly related to intervention.

Methodological problems

severely limit the validity of these findings: ' 1 forei gn armed· attack ·
events" were measured, rather than interventions; regressionc analysis
~as_ used despite the difficulty:of conceptualizing fractiohs ·o( in~.

.

.

. . terventions predicted by regression coefficients; no attempt was made
.

.

-

'

.

,

.

to validate measurements o·f domestic conffi ct ~
Since _am.bigufties in the domestic ~tructurc;i.l war category make
it very difficult to measure (no one has yet succeeded in measuring
'

.

the number .of soci e·ta l sectors, domestic, or foreign policies aff~cted
o.r changed by civil conflict, nor the amount of .ideology involved),
.

.

.

at this point it seems best to adopt categories of doniesticv.iolence
. produced by exi s:ti.ng empirical studies and determine whi ch;most closely
. approximates s trutturcfl war·. · The conflict l i ter~ture has produced a
·. remarkably stable (across· studies of different countries and timeperiods) three-way classification (thro!,Jgh factor analysis of post.

.

World War I.I domestic conflicts) of domestic conflict:
d.i sturbances or

11

turmoi

in (incl ud,ing

(l)mass civil

riots and anti-gover~ment demon-

strations); (2) elite instability ('including purges~· coups, major.
government· crises, general
.. strikes, assassinations1,. and _Other typ~s.
.

,

'

of conspiracies); apd (3) larg·e scale societal upheavals (including.

J

civil war:s, widespread vfolence, guerilla wars, and--in _some studies
--assassinations).

'

(See Hazlewood, 1973:11-13; l1ilkenfe1d,, 197r8;
.

-

· Gurr, 1968; Feiera~end, Feierabend, et.
Rummel, 1965; and Tanter, 1965.)
II

tl•,

.

.,

1966; .Nesvold·~- 1967;

Hazlewood_ (1973:14) points out the

structural II nature of the third category:

II

Wl despread

intense. and

attempts to c~an·ge the occupants of key roles, remove the government
in power and·. alter the direction of th~ society. 11

In the present study, two separate data sets (Taylor and Hudson; '
1972; and Banks, 1971) on domestic conflict are related to foreign

military intervention, in part to compensate for the w~aknesses· of·.

of

each set and, through replication, to determine validity

findings.

Conflict categories· ar~ somewhat different in thetwosets,' and in
• •

j

-

.

this study, tategori~s will be selected which:

•

(1) diOffe~enti~te -·

violent. from non.:.vio 1ent conflict; and (2-) rel ate most cl early to
.

.

.

.

.

'

. the three domestic conflict categorles outlined above; :and ·to struct~ral confl~ct (societal upheavals) in par~icular; the variables are
listed .in Table l.

Certain variables are listed in more than one .

category either becaus·e there is ~i sagreeme~t in the conflict liter· ature on the proper catego'ry, or becausethe variable could be-categorized differently under various conditions.

For instance, political

executions could be punishments for elites, or masses, or could be
part of structural violence, and could be authorized before or after

a chan,ge

in government (change taken to m~an newpersbnnel}~. Vari- .

ables subject--to such uncertain.ties are included in.the analysis,'
however,.,because:. (1). they.have· important consequences for people
. lives, and it is important to know thei.r relation to mil_itary_'intervention

15
( for instance, whether po-1 i ti cal executi ans generally increase after
- interventions); and (2) they may indicate ~hat structural, as opposed
.to-non-structural, dispute~' are taking place

(in many c~ses; success-

ful or unsuccessful attempts at social revolution lead to mass. arrests,

•

executions, etc.) .

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

FINDINGS
Domestic conflicts evidently-are hot sufficient condi-tions for
outside military intervention, but in certain situations they seem
.

.

to be necessary conditions (see Table 2) .. • For example, from 1960-67,
74% of states (130) re_ceived no reported (as opposed to' allege.d) interventions regardless of their level of riots or of deaths due to
domestic vi o1ence, and 64% of ·states experiencing 18 or mo.re riots,
. and 53% of those with 171 or more deaths, sti 11 had no interventions ..
.

On

.

.

.

.

'

the-·other hand, 53% of states (34} receiving intervention had many

(over:49; categories determined by equalizing states in lihigh, medium,
and low") armed ~ttacks--~ form ~f orga~;ie/ and perhap~- ~ven stru~- _
-

-

-

.

tural violent political 'conflict (and 43% of countries with many armed
attacks.received .i nterven:ti ans). - These figures are ~ans i derably greater _
than those expected by chance al~ne gfven the percentage of all states
with much conflict or with inter_ventions.

Indeed, all types

of

civil

violence were more frequently ~ssociat~d with stat~s~eteiving inter-

.

-

_ve'ntions than e_xpected by· chance alone,- with armed'attacks,- deaths,
.

.

irregular .power transfers - ( usuany coups uns.ucces~ful -or $Ut~essfu·l),
government sanctions ( ar~ests ,--censorship, etc.); execi.~tions, revel uti ons (armed groups attempting ,to form indep,endent governments--,in- -

c_l udi rig coups or ci vi 1 wars),_ and reg-ul.ar exe<uti ve transfers 1eading

TABLE l
DOMESTIC CONFLICT VARIABLES l
• Non-Violent
Elite
Instability

Mass·
P,rotest.

Violent
Structural
·Conflict ·

Elite
Instability .

Mass
Protest

Structural
Conflict
'.

Executive Ad~

Irreqular Power
Transfer (T.H.)·

Regular Executive
Transfers (T .'H.)

Purges (B)

2
j ustments (T. H.) .

. Government
Change

,

Political Assas'in_ations (T.H)
(Government ·
Sanctions) (T.H.)
(Political Executions (T.H.) ·
Politi cal As.sas-.
inations (B)

(Government
.. ('Armed Attacks)
. Sanctions) (LH.) (T.H.)
·. (Irregular Power,
Trans fer) (T. H. )
(Deaths from political violence):
(T. H.)
(Political Assas(Political Exiriations) (T.H;)
~cutions) (T.H.) ..
(Guerilla Warfare)
(B)
(Poli~ic~l Executions) (T. H. )(Revolutions) (B)
(Political .Assas-...

· i nations)
{B)
. .
.

.

.

.

.
.

(Government Sanctions) (J'.H.)
.

,;··

TABLE l (Cont.)
DOMESTIC CONFLICT VARIABLES ·
·. _Non-violent
Elite
I.nstabil i ty.
Renew Executive
Tenure (T .H.)
No Government Change

Unsuccessful Regu1ar Executive
· Transfer (T. H.
(Po.litical Strikes)
(T.H.)

Mass
Protest.

Violent
Structural
Conflict·

Protest·Demon. stations (T.H.)

Elite.···.
. Instability
un·successful Irregular Power
· Transfer (T.R.)

Riots (T.H.)
. Riots (B)
·

Structural
· . Conflict
Armed Attacks
(T .H.)

.

Regime Support
Demonstrations

Deaths from Political Violence

(LH.)

(T.H .)

Political Strikes
(T. H.)

( Ri ots ) ( T. H• ) ·
(Riots) (B)
( Go·vernment
~anctions} (T.H.)

. ( Rel ax,,Government
Restrictions)
(T.H.). .

Mass
Protest

(Rel a)<- ·Govern- (Rel ax Government Restri c- . ment Restrfc..: . ··
tions) (T.H .. )
tions) (T:H.)

(Government.
Sanctions)
(T.H.) .

(Political Ex~~u~ · · (Politic~l
tions) (T.H.)
.. Executions).
. (T. H. )' ·

(Unsuccessful Ir. regular Power
Trans·fer) (T. H.)
.(Government
Sanctjons) (T.H.)

TABLE l (Cont.)
DOMESTIC CONFLICT VARIABLES
Non-Violent
Elite
Instability

Mass
Protest

(General
Strikes) (8)3

General
Strikes (B)

Violent
Structural
Conflict

Elite
Instability

Mass
Protest

Purges (B)

Structural
· c·onfl i ct
(Political
Executions)
(T. H.)

Government
Crises (B)
No Government
Change

Anti-Government Derronstrati ons (B)

(Protest
Oemonstrations)(T.H.)

Revolutio·ns (B)

Revolutions
(B)

Gueri 11 a
Warfa re ( B)
Revolutions (B)

(Regime Support
Demonstrations)
(T. H.) ·
(Anti-Government
Demonstrations) (B)
1 Parentheses around a variable indicate that it is only tentatively placed in this ca.~egory, since there
is disagreement in the conflict literature or since it co~ld reasonably apply to more than one category.
2
.
.
"T.H." refers to Taylor and Hudson, 1972 as source of variable.
311 B11 refers to Banks, 1971 as source of variable.

T6 _
- the way.

On. the other h'and, assassinations, purges, riots, unsuccess- .I ._

·_.

J

•

;

•

,

-

·,:,

•

••

:·

-·

ful regular transfers· (cabinet shuffles), strjkes, government crises
.

,.

·· and protest demonstrations were -relatively only s-1 i ghtly more fre- ·
2
interventions than chance wo.ul d predict.
· quently accompanied

b;

••

Generally, though, organized political violence has been a recurrent
- characteristic of intervention targets (gamma between armed attacks · and intervention targets = .56, signif_icant p2 .001, N-= 130). · Rel a.

.

~io~s.Bre stronger for friendly than for hostile interv~ntion, how.

ever;

.

;

.

,

70% of targets of friendly i nterventi_ons (20) had many armed

, a"ttacks, while 44% of hostile intervention targets

(l'6J ..had many:·

armed attacks
.

.

~

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Some of the concentrations ofarmed attacks, deaths, and sanctions
cbul~ be due·to ~ourte coverage bias in the data.

By chance alone it

- ,s likely that certain of these conflicts w~uld co-occ'ur with intervehtions sin.Ce they are the' most frequently reported conflicts in the
'

'

_ Tayl or:..Hudson. data from 1960-67. 3 I~ ~n attempt' to ·correct for such

di-stortion, tomparati ve fi gu~es are provided (Table 2) for countries tindergoi ng no intervention -or no· con fl, ct. · The i nc:i dence -of armed·
attacks can be compared for states undergoing zero vs. at least one
_,.,

.

intervention, without the need-to compare armed attacks to riots or
other conflicts. · A_gain~ across nearly all types -of conflict, interventioris are mo~e lik~ly_to·occur in conflict than ~on~conilict ~itti_ations, and high conflict totals ar~ more likely, to occur in countries
receiving than in those not receiving interventions._ - Furthe:r.more,
the differences between the·se: expe~imental _and controJ group findings

.-

.. !.

TABLE 2
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS--1960-67
Countries With Violent Conflicts
% much conflict

also
intervention

Irr~gular Power Transfer

% no conflict

also
intervention

47%
[37%]

(T. H.)

Unsuccess.ful Irregular Power
Transfers (T.H.)

4.4%

Political Assassinations (T.H.)

36%

44%

Political Assassinations (B.)

Governmental Sanctions (T.H.)

22%

23%

Revolutions (B.)

42%

20%

43%

12%

Riots (B.)
Armed Attacks (T.H.)
Deaths from Political Violen~e
(T. H.)

Guerilla Warfare (8.)

l 0%

24%

l 0%

24%

15%.

24%

12%

29%

15%

56%

26%

(75%)

33%

23%

35%

26%

42%

18%

35%
[53%]

18%

47%

30%

[33%]

Riots (T.H.)

27%

[47%]

(27%)

Purges (B.)

% non-intervention
al so
much conflict

[35%]

[44%]

Political Executions (T.H.)

% intervention
al so
much conflict

36%
[28%]

19%

27~0

27%

35%

35%

43%
[33%]

9%

53%
[70%]

25%

47%
'[33%]
( 21 %)

37%
[30%]

. [60%]

15%

59%
[70%]

24%

(56%)
21 %

35°s
[53%]

22%

. )'

TABLE 2 (Cont.)
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND rnREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS--1960-67

Countries With Non~Violent Conflict~
% much conflict

also .
intervention

· % no conflict · .. % intervention
also
also ..
intervention
much confl_ict

Executive A"djustments
(new personnel} ·

.-37%
. (23%)

Regular Executive Transfers
(new administrations)

42%
[29%]
(32%)

22% ·

'31%

Polttical Strikes (B:)

. % non-i'ntervention
.• also
much conflict,

47%
(63%)

28%

56%.
[65%]
(56%)

27%

26%

12%

23%

32%

23%

35%

26%

General Strikes (B.)

33%

27~/,,.

10%

$%

· Government Cris.es (B.)

30%

t2%

. 28%

25%'

33%
(22%)

23%

41 %
(56%)

29%

35%
(22%)

-.19%

. 38%.
(50%)

25%

-3g~~

28%

38%
(44%)

24%

Unsuccessful Regular Executive
· Transfers (including. cabinets)
(T. H.)

-Protest Demonstrations (T. H.)
'

'

Regime Support Demonstrations
(,:.H:)
Anti-Government Demonstrations

(s~ l

.

. · '(24%)

-~er~entages in ~arentheses r~f~r only to h~stile interventions
Pertentages in brackets refer.only to friendly interventions

j

-.__
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are greater for armed attacks, deaths, and sanctions than for any
other types of verbal or non-verbal conflict--indicating that these
are the conflicts most likely to breed or result from foreign military interventions.

Irregular power transfers (successful and un-

successful), and regular transfers were the next most interventionrelated conflicts.
There is some support for the hypothesis that violent conflict
is more likely than non-violent to attract foreign military intervention, though the evidence is mixed.

In general, percentages for

countries with much violent domestic conflict also receiving intervention were considerably greater than.those with non-violent conflict:, while the patterns were less clear for states with interventions also undergoing domestic conflict.

A difference of means test

(presuming that the variables in this study are a non-random sample
from a population of conceivable domestic conflict variables, ignoring,
for illustrative purposes, the probably skewed pattern of interventions
across such a population, and correcting statistically for the small
number of cases, the difference of means gives a rough app~oximation
of the statistical s·ignificance of differences between violent and
non-violent conflict;

see Hays, 1963) indicates that, in countries

.;_

with much conflict also receiving interventions, there were signifi.cantly more interventions with violent than with non-violent conflicts
(p ~.01; .equally significant differences are found when mean difference
between obtained and expected percentages for violent and non-violent
conflict are compared).

However, reversing the process, there is no

significant difference between levels of violent vs. non-violent

•

, 18

conflicts occuring· in states with at least one interv~ntion~
..

.

.

Indeed

.

. interventicins seemed more likely to occui~ith c~rtain types of rionviolent(executive adjustments.or protest demonstrations) than violent
(assassinat~6ns ot ex~cutions) conflict.·

Ir, general, military interventions. seemed·most 'likely to occur·
I

.

in countries experiencing many government sanctions, armed attacks,
deaths_ from political violence, executive adj'ustments, and regular.
executive transfers. · Furthermore, interventions occurred relatively
·. infrequently in states undergoing 1nany assassinations, purges, unsuc- ·
cessful regular po~er transfers, political strikes, and. governmental
crises.

Of.Gourse, these patterns could be coincidental, ~nd da~a

over ei_ght years do not indicate whether conflict's or interventions
preceded each 6ther or were even associated with each. other in time.
.

.

.

.

.

,'

Specific ti'me order, ngs wi 11 be examined· below..
I

.

• ,

•

•

First, however, it wouid be useful to identify the particul_ar
types of intervention most closely asso~iated with particulcir:'types
of' domestic conflict, and then to examine'the role
'

I

flict in predicting intervention (Table 3).

of

structu~al

cbn-

For instance, ideological,

territorial, social, economic, and military-diplomatic protective
interventions; as well as .interventions in domestic disputes, seemed
. to occur tri states undergoing inany riots (50% of territoriaJ, 50% of
social, .64% of ideological, 56% of rriilitarY-diplomatic, and 67% of
_economic~..:although th~re were ,n-ot inore thap .eleven of any such inter~
ventions from 1960-67).

Genera.l strikes, unsuccessful coups, and abortive

-· tabi~et shuffles ,~er:e unlikely _to draw outside military intervention;
The only types of intervention evidently linked to ass.assinati9ns

]9

we,re social prote,cti ve,. i deol ogi cal

~

military-diplomatic and evacua,-

ti ons-~and there were so few social and evacuation·(6:and 3) interven.

.

.

.

'

tion targets from 1960-67 that valid conclusions are difficult. :Social
protective i nterventi ohs took pl ace in Cypr'~s, the Congo (by the UN) ,
Ethiopia (by Somalia), -the Dominican Republic (OAS), Portuguese territories, and South Vietnam.

Assassinations inside Portugal probably

had little direct bearing c:m India 1 s move into Goa; in Vietnam, ass-.
assinations (carried on by both sides in the civil war) seemed to
iesuli from or a~company (rather than lead to) North'Vietnamese
milita,ry intervention; Cyprus wa;·not high.in assassinations; the
'

tr~jillo assassinati~n

'

'

did not immediat~ly lead td military inter-

veniion in the Dom~nican Republic, tho~gh ~t ,-like the Diem a~s~s~inaticin, s~t en~ugh go~ernmental conflict in motion to event~~lly
draw_ in foreign states.

Thus, in some cas_es, ass·assinations may be
'

'

causally connec.ted to social protectfve interventions, and in som~
cases hot; but on the whole they were not likely t~ produce inter/

venti ons.

'

-

The same may be true of other fo~ms of domestic confl itt.

·Frequent successfl.ll coups were not oJten a characteri sti C .of inter:.
ventibn targets in ~he 60 1 s, and·only evacuations and social protective interventions occurred more than 50% of the time in states with
many coups (occurring in S.outh Vietnam, the .Congo, and Domini can
. . Rep u bl i c ) .
. TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Nearly every type qf intervention.s·e·ems to take place.in coun..;.
tries experiencing many regular_exe_cutive tran$fers (Syrfa~ South',
Vietnam', Congo (K), Yemen, Sou.th Yeme_n; furthermore, some.countries

I ,

r

TABLE 3
,

.

.

.

-

TYPES OF DOMESTIC, CONFLICT AND FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION
-

Domesti~ Conflict

.

·-

·Types of Intervention M~·st Often· Associated
(~ 50% of Interventions)

Riots (T.H.)

. Domestit Disputes; Social; Territorial;
Military-Diplomatic; Economic;- Ideofogical

Riots (B:)

· Domestic Disputes; Evacuati~ns; Mili.taryDiplomatic; Social

Deaths (T.H.)

Assassinations (T.H.)

Domestic Disputes; Regional Poi.-ier Balance;
Economic; Military-Diplomatic; ·Territorial;
Ideological
· Social
.

..;\.

.

.•

.. '

As~assinations (B.)

Evacuations;· Mil itary;-D'ipi omatic; Social;
Ideological

Armed Attacks (T ..H.)

Domestic Disputes; Economic; Military:- · ·
Diplomatic; Territorial; Social; Regional
. Power Balance;· Ideological

Revolutions (B.)

Domestic D1spu".fe~~ Evacuations.; Mtl itary:
Dip.lomatic; Social

Protests (T~ H.)

Economic; Territorial~ Social; Regional
Power Bal a nee;· I.deal ogi,ca l '
·

Protests ·(B.)

-Evacuations; Mil itary-Diplomat:ic; Social

Regime s.uppa,r;t (T.H.. )

Economic; Mil itary-Dipl omati c; Terri tori al;
Social; Regional Power Balance

Strikes (T. H.)

Territorial; Social

Strikes (B.),

None

,Unsuccessful Regular
Executive Transfers
(T.H~)

None

Unsuccessful Irregular
Power Transfers· (T. H.)

None

Irregular Power.
Transfers (T.H.)

Evacuations; Social

I

.

,.\

TABLE 3 (Cont.).
TYPES OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT AND FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION :
Type·s of ·Intervention Most Often .Associated
(~ 50% of Interventio~~)
·

Executive Adjustments
(T.H.) . .
. Regu1~r Ex~cuttve
Transfers, (i'. H. )

Domestic Disputes; Poli cie~-.Condit.i ans;·
Territory; Social; Regio.nal Power Balance
Domestic Dispute; Evacuations; ·Policies.;;.·
· Conditions; Economic; Military'.'"Diplomatic; .
Territorial; Socia1;. R~gional · Power Balance;
,Ideological
· ·

Executions (T;H.)

Social.

Purges. (B.)

Evacuations; ,Military-Diplomatic; Territorial;
Social
·

Sanctions

Domestic Disputes; Evacuations; PoliciesConditions; Economfc; Military-Diplomatic;·
Territorial; Soc fa]; R~gional. Power Balance;
··
· ·
·
·
Ideological

Guerilia War (B~)

D6mestic Disputes; tva~uations;~:Econrimic;
Soc;a1; Ideologic~l
· ·

Gove·rnment Crises

Evacuations; Military-Diplomatic;· So.cial

.

-

..

.

(B. )' ,

..

'

'

::;

\·

\ ..
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with many trans,fer~ were interveners_:
.

'

.

Greece and -South Korea), many_

.

government s·anctions (Indon_esia, South Vietnam, Congo, Algeria), or.

.

· many armed attacks. , Such. conflicts may be part of a syndrome which,
while not invariably (nor even usually) attracting intervention, was
· ,often associated with- intervention (Malaysia, South Vietnam, Algeria, ·
Cyprus, India, Congo, and Laos were- ·among the world. leaders in armed attacks by organized opposition groups, and re~eived'num~rous interventions in _domestic disputes as well), .and with the most types of
intervention.

In. some c~untries, regular transfers may be a result of

. , violent domestjc conflicts as governments· fail to keep the peace, and
-tra'nsfers may spark a call for outside intervention or may result,.
from the dissatisfaction caused by outside· interve·ntion .. I_t remains

or foll owed

to be seen wh_ether such conflicts preceded
.

.

.

.-

:

the foterven.

tions' and whether causal cQnnections can be discovered.
Of the ~ariables which might conceivably reflect ;,structural
conflict" (Tab.le 2),. oniy armed aftacks ,' d~aths, and government sane,:;,
, ti ons were -associ at-ed with more than_ 50% of -i nterventi'on targets·.

Guerj l la

warfare (as distinct from armed attacks ingenerai, an~ defined by
Banks as armed activity .by bands or irregular forces aimed at govern''

.

.

.

.

mental overthrow, usually through sporadic attacks) and poli ti.cal
executions did not seem strongly related to interv-ention (though 53% of
target; or friendly intervention~ had much gueri~la warfa~ei •

. -.:,_
-

-'

'

.

Intervention targets also frequen.tly. experienced many riots.

Since

,. riots,' sanctions, and .revolutions (less, sp-oradi c than "gueri 11 a warfare") can affect few or many sectors of a society, since. the data .do
'not afford an opportunity to count sectors, arid since both violent .

21
and_ non-violent conflicts may attract foreign.military interventions,
it seems b~si t6 describe patterns of intervention- provoking conflict
rather than to speak of structural conflict.

Frequently falling

(through legal IT!eans)
governments, governments un~erorganized violenf
.
'
;

attack, governments resorting_to violent or forceful repression qf
the population were the most likely targets for foreign military intervention.

Governments employing many sanctions were the main target
\

of hostile interveners (along with governm~nts undergoing many domestic·
protests, support demonstrations, and changes in personnel).

Govern-

ments in countries with many armed attacks, riots, and deaths due to .
· politic;al violence :were the main targets of friendly interveners.
Inter~stingly, m6unting deaih tolls and widespread violenc~~ which
often sign~f governmental weaknesses _and/o~ r:ebel strerigth·, did not.
\"

seem to preclude interventions to support those governments ..
- To determin~ whether the above patterns are coincid~ntal, ipurious,
or- valid, analysis has_been run using the.Taylor-H'udson da_i.ly con.flict
· data.

The question is . whether domestic ~onflicts:occur soon enough·
.

.

\

before or after interventions to presume some causal relation (ob~.
viously, though, even if domestic conflicts draw·the interest and attention of outside intervener~, they
are not nec~siarily -the cause
.
.

of interventions) .. For each intervention target, the number of days
on which domestic confl ic1s were reported (not necessarily occurred on
those days) wi_thin three months, six months, and on_e year prior ·fo:
and ~fter the interventions were determined (Table 4):

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

.

TABLE 4
· : PERCENTAGE OF INTERVENTIONS (N = 90) WITH ATLEAST ONE
· DAY. OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT BEFORE OR AFTER
,..

BEFORE
'

.

AFTER

.

Domestic
. Conflicts

0-3mo - 3-6mo·

6mo-lyr

3-6mo · .0-3mo

Riots (T.H.) ·

37%
(1;17)*

20%
(4;4)

22%
(.1; 8)

Deaths (T. H~ )

64%
( 1; 98)

- 43%
( l ; 46)

40%
( l ; 58)

38% .
.46%.
38%
(2; 66) · (l; 50) (l;37)

Assassinations
(T. H.)

11 %
( l; 2)

9%
( l; 2) -

7%
(1;4)·

u; 4%l}

. Armed Attacks (T.H.)
~.

64%
(l ;98)

Protests (T.H.)

39%
26%
.(1;16r (1;10)

6mo- l~r- 29%
(1;13)

11 %
3%
(1;2) · (l; 1)

46%
53% .-·. _47%.
44%
47%
(l,2;61) (l ; 61) ( l, 6 ;· 68) ( l ; 44 ) '(l,2;88)

30%
(i;46)

28%
(1; 9)

· 29%
( l; 5)

31%
( l; 36)

17%
19%
( l; 28) . (1;10)

Regime Support
(T.H.) -··. ·

39%
( l; 8)

19%
( l; 4)

27%
(2;4)

24%
( l; 8)

17%
(l:;8)·

Strikes (j.H.)

·16%
(l;ll)

.. 7%.
(1,3;3)

9%
( l;?)

13% ·
11 %
12%
(1;9) . (1;2)
( l; 9)

Unsuccessful
Regular Transfers
(T.H.)

- 3%
(1; 1)

(h 1)

{0;0)

3%
( l; ·1 )

{l; 1)

- - l %_{l;l)

Unsuccessful Ir. regular Transfers
(T.H.)

- 9%
(1;2)

3%
(1; l)

4"%
(l ; l )

6%
(l; l)

6%
'(l;l)

7%
( l; 1)

Irregular
-. Transfers (T.H.)

7%
( l; 2)

1%
(2;2)

8%
(1; 1)

12%
( l; 3)

7%
( l; 3)

3%
.· (1; l)

29%'

. 43%

·.

•-;,

:~.

.-

2% -

. 0%·

·_ 1%-

24%
(1;7)'

Executive Adjustments -(T~ H~-)

50%
{1;13)

27%
· {1;3)

36%
(1 ;4)

29%.
( l; 4)

( f; 4) -_ ( l; 5)

Regula~ Transfer~
(:r. H.)

28%
( l; 2)

· 17%
(l; 2)

19%
(1;3)

34%
( l; 3)

16%
( l; 5)

19%
.(1;5)·

TABLE 4 (Cont.)
· PERCENTAGE OF INTERVENTIONS (N = 90) WITH-AT LEAST ONE
. DAY OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT BEFORE· OR AFTE~ I
.1

~.

.,

BEFOR~

I
J

AFTER
'

Domestic ..
Conflicts

6mo-l~r · 3-6mo

0-3mo

Executions .
(T. H. )·

18%
( l; 3)

0; 3)

13%
_(3;4)

Government
Sanctions (T.H.)

81%
(2;52)

Relax Restric- ·
tions (T.H.).

56%
(1;13)

. 0-3mo· · 3-6mo · 6mo-l~r
11%
( l; 5)

· Tl% _
(1 ;2)

- 63%
69%
{1;20) · (2;24)

80%
(l ;47)

70%.
66%
(1;20) · ( l ; 30)

36%
( l; 5)

46%
(1;10)

37%
( l; 6)

7%

39%
(1;5).

14%·.

(1; 2)

37% ·
(l;ll) -

· *Figures i-n parentheses indicate -the ·modal (other than zero) and
• highest (in that order) numb~r of days of corifli~ts· in the time
· periods preceding or following interventions, for those interven. tfons which were preceded or followed by c;:onflict:
·
I

-a

-

22
.

'

'

There was considerable relation fo time between the·onset."of..foreiqn military
interventions and riots, deaths, armed attacks, demonstrations, executive· adjustments and transfers, increa~~d and decreased sancti~ns. ·
'

"

•

•

•

I

•

•

.

'

0ri6e agatn·it seems clear that assas~in~tions, ~trikes; succ~ss~~~ or
unsuccessful coups, executions, and. unsuccessful bids to legally
change ~dministrations neither attracted nor resulted from foreign
,

military interventfon.

,

.

Riots, protest and support d~mohstratioris,

executive adjustments, and.regular executive· transfers (ne~ admfoistrations) had a moderate associatiori (roughly 20-401 of interventions
associated in tirneJ; while armed attacks, deaths, government sanctions
and relaxation of sanctions, all had relatively strong a~sociations
(35-50% or more).

Eighty percent of interventions were a1mosf im:-

mediateiy followed by ~ove~nmeni sancti~ns (~rackdo~ns-o~ p6litical
freedom),·

In general' as many or more reported d~ys of violence fol-

lowed as pre~eded interventions.

Claims that the impdsition of ~ili-

tary forces "stabilizes and pacifies" a target ·state see~ exaggerated;
interventions re~ult in or rrecede

increased government repres~

s1on.
During the ~ear pr~~eding or following interventioris~ the_percentages _associ_ated with domestic conflicts did not vary-greatly. This
rais_es the suspicion that while .intervenfion targets tended to .be
-· __ chara~terized by at least some deadly organized polit.fcal violence
and/or :·repression; the actual .timi,ng of the intervention may not depend on theleve_l ?f violence.

Interventions were hot necessarily_

responses to fast-breaking violence and crises. -They [llay haye-been reactions to on~going, almost chronic viol~nce.

1 -·

.·

To test the signifi~ance

.\
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o_f _the patterns during the year before or after intervention, all
.reported interventions were exqmined indi,vi_dually to determine whether
do.inesti, C conflict

11

peakedll or increased immediately befor~ or after

intervention, as compared to other times, and data on ·domestic con-·
1 flict

were d~rived for periods-without int~rventions in each ta~gei.

country.
If foreign military interventions during the .1960 1 s are examined
separately, t~e concentration of domestic conflicts'in targets frequently occurred just as the intervention .occurred.
Hudson, 1972:154-99.)

11

In many cases, domestic conflict

shortly before or after intervention
'

(Taylor and
peakedll

In the Cameroons,·the major
-

.

•.

:

·-.,

.

,,;

,

concentration of armed attacks and deaths occurred between 1959 and
.

•·

.

1961, with French military intervention occurring in January, 1960 .
. A conGentration of ,coups,_- demonstratio~s ,-·deaths, with some sanctions
·and armed attacks accompanied French intervention in Gabon (1964),
and 9eaths and sancti ans continued in Gabon until the -U.S. evacuation
intervention in April, 1964.

At the time of Fren~h interv~ntion· in

.the Congo· Brazzaville (August, 1963), there were.protes·t·demonstra. tions .and riots' with one armed attack' 'some deaths-, governmehtal
sancion~, and a coup. - However, there were more sanctions and executive adjustments in 1965 with no intervention.

At the

time of British

interventions in East Africa (January, 1964), ·an army mutiny .in
..

'

· Kenya had produced sanction~, de_aths ,' and armed attacks, but Uganda
- had far less conflict ( though the -few armed -attacks and sanctions in. dicate the Ugandan government's concern :about spreading trouble from
·Kenya}.

Intervention in-Tanzania came wi.th deaths, armed attacks,

I
J
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and one riot_,_and was immediately followed by a series of:gbvernment sanctions against political opponents~~
Of the

34 repor_ted intervention targets froin 1960-67., 16 had_ a

· concentration or great h,umber of riots, armed attacks, deaths, sanctions; or protests just prior to at least one of their interventfons
(

-I

(if a country had scattered co'nflict or only sanc~ions or protests
it was not touhted).

These 16 cases reveal situations in which do11

mestic conflict could conceivably have

caused 11 a large power (U.S.,

UK, France) or -allie·s of such powers (New Zealand, Australia) to
intervene- to protect target governments against domestic· disruptio-n;
these were interventi ans 'designed to

II

stabi l; ze 11 targets so that

major power interests were not harmed by extremists.

Thus, ~hen do-

-

"

mestic conflict led to intervention, interveners were likely to be.
powers shoring up t_he status'.'"quo.
.

South Africa's 1967 military i~-.

.

-

'

-

. tervention in Southern Rhodesia al~o fit thii mode; indeed~ even
· Syria's 1963 intervention in 'Iraq was designed to put down a threat
.,

1:o the B_aathi st regime.

'

The UAR so~ght to u~hold the status-~uo i~

Yem~n' as· well. : Even ·supp~sedly revolution regimes intervened abroad
mainly to defend.rather than subvert -extsting governments.

The other

ca~es of intervention concerned social protective (~reek~ Tu~k~sh~ UK,
and UN interventions in Cyprus) or ideofogicaLand regional power
(Malaysia into" Indonesia}' interests.
_ Thus, while successful or unsuccessful coups

did not seem very

likely to bring intervention, social unrest capped-by organized elite
violence (ar(TJed attacks, de~ths) seem the.most likely domestJc·con- ·
flict triggers of military in~ervention by foreign powers interested

25
.

in propping up target governments.

,

Even extensive widespread fighting

in the target did not seem to deter friendly (pro-government) interveners.
In terms of magnitude of violenc~ or numbers of people involved
in conflicts in the three-month periods. immediately ~efore interventions, 11 of the 42 interventions after armed attacks (codable for
people involved) fonowed arined attacks with betwenn 100 and 10,000
people involved.

Interveners confronted c6nflicts of considerable

magnitude in such instances.

Thirteen of 57 interve_ntions following

· government sanctions followed sanctions of this magnitude as well.
For interventions which were followed by. conflicts (within the -next.

35 were followed by armed attacks .involving more

three inonths), 13 of

than lOOpeople, 11 of28 were foll.owed by protest.demonstrations of
more than

ioo, and 12 of 22 by support.demonstrati6ns·of more than
i'2 by strikes of more than ·100, 21 of 72 by s·ancti ons in.

100,

5 of

.

volving more than ·100 people, and 9 of ·41 by governmental.relaxations
~

.

.

.

:involving more than 100. _Thus, an average of 35% of these conflicts
immediately following military interventions i~volved more than 100
people, which gives some idea of_the extent of disruption associated
with interventions, though the data on magn.itudes are subject to some
question~ 4 ·
A control-group of dates was selected_, one for each country which
..

had received interventions; these were dates on which no intervention
began, and--which were at least one year removed from the start of any.
intervention.

These non-intervention dates were analyzed:to determine

how many w_ere preceded or foll owed by° various types of civil conflict
. TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

TABLE 5,-·
·. PERCENTAGE OF NON-INTERVENTIONS (N = 35) WITH AT LEAST
ONE DAY OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT BEFORE OR AFTER..

:~

AFTER ·

BEFORE

;;,

Domestic
-Confl.icf

'

I

. 6mo-ly_r

3-6mo

0-3rro

023mo

3-6mo

•6mo:.. ly_r

Riots (T. H.)

31%
( l; 5)

26%
( l ;4)

26%
( 1;' 3)

6%
( l; 2)

20%
(l; 2)

26%
(1;5)

De.aths (T.H.);

43%
(1;17)

29%
(1;12)

· 26%
(1;14)

26%(1;17)

· 29%
(l; 21)

, 31%
(l; 33)

Assassinations
(T.H.)

11 %
( 1; 2)

6%
(l ; l )

6%·
{l; l)

3%
( l; l )

3%
(l; l)

9%
(1 ; 1 )

''

Arined Attacks ·

, 43%
49%
~1;47) ( l ~ l; 16)

(T. H.) .
Protests (T.H.)

14%

11%
(1;4)

-14%
( 1; 4)

( i ;2)

.11%

. _31%
·(1;3).

17%
{l; 3)

14%
(l; 2)

OOl
,o

(O;O)

11%
( l ;'3)

11 %·
( l ;·2) ·

3%
(l;-1)

0%
(O;O)

(O;O)

0%

3~{
( 1 ; l_)

(O;O)

3%
(l·
' , l).

. 3%
( 1; l)

3%
{l; l) .

3%
( l; l)

20%
(1;16)

26%
(l; 6)

,( i ;7)

17% .

11 %
(1,2;2)

Strikes (T.Hd

17%
( l;2)

Unsuccessful
. Regular Trans.:
fers (T.H.)

3%·
(1;1)'
6%

37%. ·
46%
(1 ;29), · (1;47)

901lo

26%
(1,2;8)

Regime·support
--(T. H.) .·

40%··

4_3%

(J, 2; 3T) ( l; 38)

O, 2 ,:4 ; 4 ) (l; 2 )

- 17%
(1;3) ·

0.%

Unsuccessful Ir.regular Transfers
(T .H.) - .

( l; 1)

9%
(l ; l )

. Irregular Trans--·
fers (T. H.) -

3%
(2;2)

3%
( l; 1)

' 9%
(l ; l )

(O;O)

(O;O)

3%
( l; l )

· Executive ·Ad..justments

.46%
(l;3)

29%
( l; 2)

29%
( l; 3)

· 40%
,( l ; 3)

29%
( l; 4)

34%
-( l ;7)

Regular Trans-·
· fers (J. H.)

29%
(l; 2)

11 %
( l; l )

23%
·(1;2)

·. 17%

14%
(l;2)

11%
'(l,;2}.

·,

.

0%

0%

i'

_'!"_,

I

I

(1;2}

I

TABLE 5 (Cont.)
PERCENTAGE OF ~ON-INTERVENTIONS (N ,;, 35) WITH AT. LEAST . ·
.
ONE DAV OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT BEFORE OR AFTER" •·
"'.

;;

. AFTER

BEFORE
Domestic.
·Conflict

6mo- l.}'.'.r

3-,.6mo · 0-3mo

9%
(1; 1)

3%
( 1; 1)

.0%
( o;·o)

· Government
Sanctions (T.H.)

80%
(1;20)

57%
( 1; l9)

66.%
49%
'( 2; 16) (1,3;7)

Rel ax Restric;..,.
tions {T.H.)

'·40%
( 1; 7)

49%
( 1; 4)

23% .
( 1; 9)

0-3mo

3-,.6mo · · 6mri- l,}'.'.r

•

I

I
I
I

Execution~ ·(T.~.)

3%' .

3%
11%
(1; 1) . (1;2)

( 1; l)

51%
( 1 ; 6)

60%
(1;19)

20%
34%
( 1;4) · · ( l·
.., l)

· 26%
('1;3)'

.

*Figures in parenth~s indicate the modal (other than zero) and
highest (in that order)' number of days following non~inteivention
dates. . ·

..,.,,
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in the potential targ~t (compare Table 5 to Table 4).

Like interven-

tions, non-interventions were often preceded and followed by at least
·;;.

one day of armed attacks, deaths, and governmental sanctions (and
relaxation_s of sanctions), as well as by riots, protests, and executive adjustments.

This means that the frequency of newspaper reporting

of such conflicts appears to be greater th~n reports of other types of
conflicts, and also,that some of the frequent links between interventions and such conflict could be coincidental.
portant contrasts are evident:

Nevertheless, some im-

'

deaths from political violence, govern-

ment sanctions, riots and protests were much .more likely immediately
after interventions than at times of non-intervention; armed attacks,
deaths, and sanctions were somewhat more likely to precede or follow
interventions th~n non-interventions (deaths were approximately 20%
more likely to precede or quickly follow inte~ventions, and sanctions
were considerably more likely to follow than expected by.~hance). In
'

'

~ddition, th~ maximum days of conflict preceding or follo~fng inter~
ventions were generally greater than those at non-intervention periods.
Thus, civil conflict associated with ·military interventions was more
lasting and perhaps more widespread than conflict apart from military interventions.
CONCLUSION
Rosenau's assertions about structural conflict can now be seen in
better perspective.

If armed attacks and sanctions ( and the deaths

they produce) reflect structural conflict (measurement of 11 sectors 11
affected must be made), then there is support for Rosenau's hypotheses.

I
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· However, revoiutions, g'uerill a wars, coups, assassi natto_ns, and pol iti cal executions--all of which could conceivably (but need not necessarily) -reflect or ~cause profound social dislocation and change, were.
;;.

.

..

-

less ,frequently related to intervention.

...

In addition, many consti-

tutional (regui"ar) executive turnovers--seemingly a.form of elite
cpnflict--were at least as_frequently associated with interventions
as gueri 11 a ·wars, armed attacks, and revoluti ans.
.

In many cases,

.

such_ elite fostabil ity probably accompanied forms of llstructural 11
11

·conflict, but at this point it seems best to drop the

structural"

designation and speak of the particular varieties and ci usters of
· · con fl i

cf wh kh

precede or fo 11 ow .interventions , and determine the
.

.

.

circumstances (power:relationships,_- intervener interests in target,.
strength of factions in the· con_fl i cts, etc.) which di sti ngui sh con~
flicts attra~ting or res~lting from interventioni from conflicts unrelated to interventions.
One of the most important findfngs 1n the present st~d~ i~ that
intervention breeds civil· confli.ct in: the target.' Specifically,
govern~ents seem to ~uppress opposition groups in the midst ~fintreased armed attacks from such groups and in the midst of foreign
-

-

.

.

military
i nterventi on--all.
of which
produces many deaths.
.
.
.

. terveners arid fact,i.On$ which invite intervention may. seek

While ·in11 stability,II

the . result
of'intervention is a~l to6
freq~ently~p~olonged' (for as
- .

1on.g as a year· or more) . ~i ol ence and death.

I~ addition, ~hi1e both·
.'

•

..

I

interv_entions- and non-interventions we·re usually preceded or followed
by only one (mode) day of conflict, 'the maximum number of conflict
days was greater· for conflicts (almost all types) preceding or Joi lowing

J ·-
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interventions than non-interventions.

This ~vidently means.that some

<:onflids (especially armed attacks, deaths, sanctions; riots, and
protests:) are .indeed related to interventions, although most civ·il
conflicts that occur are ·not; some interventions are evidently un..; · · ·
related _(at least no more related than non-intervention dates) to civil
ton~lict. - The highe;t number of ~ays of conflict preceding interventions (correcting for the number of months involved). tended to come
zero to.three months before and after interventions (though consider·able conflict occu~red even earlier and lasted even longer).
·Empirical analysis has revealed both the.types of dom~stic confl_ict"likely.and unlikely :to lead to military. intervention by foreign
states;

There 'is some evidence for the hypotheSi s 'that violent con-

flict i~ more likely.than non-violent to.attract inter~enticins-·espec~~llY friendly interventions.

Howev~r, intervent1cin targets

frequently hijd high levels of fegular governmental transfers, and
it was not statistically clear that intervention targets were more
'

'

likely to have more xiolent than non-violent· conflict;
'

'

Armed attacks, government"sanctions, and deaths from domestic
.

-

-·

violence were the conflict·vari'ables most associated with intervehtion; o~er 50% of intervention targets had many such conflicts,·
?--

arid ·from 35-50%, or more' of. interventions were preceded or followed
by such conflicts within a yea! .. Interveriers sought to sh.ore ~P
governments.shaken.by frequent regular turnovers, armed organized
. Violence,
and violent politically
related deaths~ and such govern-.
.
'

'

'

ments evidenlly responded with in~reased _crackdowns on political
.opponents after the intervention.

A·ssassinations, coups- (successful

29

or unsuccessful), political executions, purges, and governmental
crises were. quite unlikely to result in or from intervention from
abroad.

Governments undergoing or carrying on such conflict might

rest relati.vely assured that unwanted military interference by other
countries is unlikely.

Even interventions in the midst of armed.

attacks, sanctions, and deaths from 1960-67 rarely opposed the target government.

In many ways, foreign military intervention has

remained a policy of large or small powers interested in preserving
rather than destroying a target government; paradoxically, conflict
and disruption in the target seem to increase with intervention.

NOTES
l.

An intervention data set was available as this study was fo~mulated.

(Sullivan, 1969, with the data repfoduced in Hudson and

-~-

Taylor, 1972.)

However, important interventions such as Vietnam

and Korea were not included in the existing set, and some interventions were included several times becau~e of repeated ''armed
attack events. 11

To correct for such inaccurate counts, all events

in the existing data lists were checked in the New York Times
and other sources; additional information about the events and
surrounding political circumstances was provided by scholarly
histories of the interventions.

Every event was provided with a

specifiable political or conflict context, thus eliminating unexplained or perhaps random skirmishes or incursions.

In addition,

the data were supplemented with interventions reported by Luard
(1968:62-64 and 9fr; and 1970:8-9) and Bloomfield and Beattie
(1971:33-46), and i~ several regional chronologies.

To obtain

some idea of what 'might have been missed by starting from an
existing data set instead of completely re-collecting the data,
the New York Times Index was completely rechecked for the years
1948 and 1964, and all events which fit the intervention defini-

tion for all countries in the study were recorded.

For 1948 the

existing data inc~uded all New York Times-identified interventions,
except those coricerhing the Palestine War.

For 1964, all Time~

reported interventions except UK into Uganda and UN into Cyprus
appeared in the original data.

These additional interventions

2

· were picked up in the supplementary_ data collectio~ in this study.
Thus, on the basis of two sampled years, the_ existing_ dat_a set,
. -· while not .complete, offered a ·reasonable starting pojnt .for careful recoding_ and augmentation.

.;-

An intra-code :reliability check

was run on a complex· subset of the retoded and augmented data
(dealing

with the Ethiopia-Somalia interventions), and agree-

ment-on all 52 substantive variables was 96%. - Domestic conflict data came from Taylor and Hudson (1972)
a~d Banks (1971)~

Comparison~ of these dat~ have shown th~t Banks

recorded fewer domes ti C con fl i_ ct '=!Vents (relying on the New York
Times daily ·papers as the sole data source). -(See Hudson·, 1973: -

· 618-19.)

~~mparing both ~anks (B) a~d iaylor~Huds6n (T~H)-data

to data on as sass i na ti ans ~o 11 ected be Fei era bend, F~i erabend, _.

.

- and Nesvold (1973) from 1948-67, the product-~o~ent co~~elation
between T-H (which relied on regional chronologies and the New
York Times Index) and ·Feierabencis was .89, between· Banks and
Fe'ierabends .84, and between T-H and- B .73.

Most agreements be-

tween the data sets came on countries with no or few assassinatio_ns. · Thus, the T-H and B data sets seem to complement rather
than completely repea·t each other; T-H data seem more_ compre._hensive, but B data-reflect more-careful checking of. s~ories.
-s

2.

Expected perc~ntages ·were ca-lculated.-by taking the· joint prooa:...
bilityof domesfic,conflict and interven_tio~, giyen either ll_l.O,
.

'

~

,

probability of much conflict ~r of -at least-_ one. i nte~vent ion; -for
example, if 26% of all_ countries in the wo~ld had many._jrr,egular --

·•

3
.

.

.

power transfers, 26i of states:rece.iving i~terventions could be
.

.

.

'

·. expected to have many such transfers . if there we_re no special
tendency. for tllis type confl ic:t to draw i nterv_entions.
:"ti''

3.

Number of reported deaths= 933,507; armed ~£tacks= 15,645;
sanctions = 11,186; r'idts = 4,020; protests_= 3;505; _execu..,;
tions = 3,323; relaxation of sa~ctions = 1~952;-strikes

= 1,720; _

_executive adjustments = 1,,219; assass·jnatio_ns' ·= l, 182; supportive
demonstrations = -1,013; regular .executive transfers = 536; un:-

..

successful irregular transfers= 93; unsuccessful regtilar trans~
fers =·89; irr~gular transfers= 78.

Comparable figures for

c':l,

Banks ·variables. are:. purges = 6.46; riots = 532; anti-_government
..

,.

.

.

..

demonstrations= 365~ guerilla warfare= 194; government
crises : : ll5; revolutions ,= 136; strikes ,; 108; assassina:..
tions = 64.

f-:O~ever, if days

orr which

at least one event was

reported are tabulaied,_source ~ias d~minish~i:

gov~rriment

sanctions =·8,212~ armed attacks=· 5,254;:deaths = 2,~75; ~ro~
tests= l~807; govern~ent relaxati6ns = 1,773;-ribts = 1,611~executive adjustments= 1,231; regime support= 600; regular
.

.

.

.

executive transfers = 544; political strikes = 463; exe_cu.

.

tions = 463; assassinations = 177; unsuccessful irregular transfers = 96; irregular transfers = 82.
4..

Not

a11

types of conflict in the Tayl or;..Hudson data had magni-

tudes ~f-people involved reported;. unsucces'sful and successful :
. irregu_lar power· transfers, and regular executive transfers had
no· reported magnitudes.

Ori the other hand, government sanctions

4
·. and relaxation of sanctions, along with protest and support
.demo_n$trati.ons, ·stri_kes,. riots, and armed attacks had the highest
reported ·magnitudes. · Taylor and Hudson I s· magnitude coding for .
daily events may have exaggerated conflict magnitudes by ·cumula. ting accounts of people_ involved over long periods· (an event may
have been reported on one day but may have occurred sometime be- ...
fore or occurred continuously for some period--e.g., rioting),.
and perhaps there was some coding error as we 11. . For instance,
I

two regime support demonstrations had magnitudes of 8 and g;..~with
rriagni tude coded by powers of 10--so that upwards of l billion
people were supposedly involved!

Because of these. possible

an6rriolies, magnitudes have been used .only fa~ ill~itrative purpose's in this 'study and were not included· in data analysis for
· hypothesis· testing.
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